Russell Kirk and the Critics

Russell Kirk's *The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana* (1953) was an unequivocal challenge to Lionel Trilling's confident 1950 assertion that liberalism was so dominant as to be the sole intellectual tradition in America. The book unearthed a series of thinkers who embodied a tradition opposed to radicalism in all its forms—not least, Kirk implied, the soft radicalism of American liberalism. The book received unexpectedly favorable reviews in *Time* and *The New York Times Book Review*, transforming the publication of a thick book by an obscure author into an intellectual event.

Confronted with such an unexampled challenge, prominent representatives of the American liberal order responded with critical counter-attacks. *The New Republic* published a review titled "The Blur of Mediocrity" by Francis Biddle, who had been Attorney General under Roosevelt and a judge at Nuremberg. Presidential candidate Norman Thomas, critic and poet John Crowe Ransom, and Professor Clinton Rossiter all cast a critical eye on portions of Kirk's argument. This extensive press, both positive and negative, helped launch Kirk as a conservative standard-bearer.

Strikingly, most of the critical objections raised in contemporary reviews of *The Conservative Mind* seem far more time-bound than does Kirk's book itself. In reviewing the charges of these temporally parochial

critics, the conviction grows that Kirk's book certainly warrants its status as a classic of conservative thought.

Some critics focused on Kirk's alleged ignorance of the class struggle. In United Nations World, Norman Thomas found Kirk's idea of a "democracy of elevation" wanting, because Kirk did not appreciate "socialism, the welfare state, and the income tax."2 In the Western Political Quarterly, Gordon Lewis, reading Kirk "like a socialist," complained that Kirk failed to accept the evidence of "a growing rigidity in class membership" and the emergence of an American proletariat.3 (Lewis also thought Kirk did not sufficiently credit recent sociological work demonstrating that rationality is shaped "to a significant degree by the sexual foundations of experience.") Conversely, other reviewers criticized Kirk precisely for his interest in class struggle: Biddle understood Kirk to be endorsing a "pre-modern" from of hierarchy opposed to democratic equality.

A young Peter Gay writing in *Political Science Quarterly* expressed shock over Kirk's statement that the right to property could be more important than the right to life. Gay was referring to a quotation from Paul Elmer More that did not entirely re-

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flect Kirk's own view. Kirk used the quotation to illustrate More's wide-ranging critique of modernity, which he generally supported. But Kirk himself did not endorse any unrestricted "right to property," and he parted company with such conservatives as Richard Weaver who contended that property was a "metaphysical right." Even if it were, Gay completely avoided the deeper argument that More and Kirk were advancing: that there may be principles more important than the preservation of life.

Some critics sought to undermine the work by questioning Kirk's choice of conservative thinkers. Bernard Crick in the Review of Politics opined that "Kirk has gathered together under the name of modern conservatism as weird a collection of unlikelies as ever went to sea in a sieve."6 And Harvey Wheeler in Shenandoah asked of Kirk's account "whether more than that one tradition cannot be justly identified with the Anglo-American conservative mind." Wheeler took particular exception to the "highly selected segment of the Burkean tradition" Kirk emphasized, and he wondered at the omission of Hamilton, Bolingbroke, and Walter Lippman.⁷ It would take Kirk another decade to explain why Bolingbroke, though admirable, was no conservative, going beyond his unpersuasive exclusion of Bolingbroke in The Conservative Mind on the grounds of non-theism.8 Wheeler, however, did not identify his own criteria for who should be considered a conservative.9 His "argument" amounted to a preference for one set of figures over another.

Wheeler referred specifically to the omission of Eliot as evidence of the "incompatibility of Kirk's conservatism with the doctrines of...Eliot in particular." Wheeler thought that adding Eliot's "eternal Thomism" would contradict the "value-free relativism of the anthropologist" that was "fundamental" to both Kirk and

Burke.¹¹ To include Eliot, Wheeler argued, would transform The Conservative Mind from an exposition of conservative principles into an "analysis of the Thomistic tradition in Anglo-American conservatism." Kirk later did add Eliot, calling him a "principal conservative thinker" of the twentieth century and placing him as a bookend to Burke.12 But instead of creating a Thomistic defense of conservatism, Kirk focused on the importance of the poet to culture. A poet is able to reconstruct order through the use of imagination: "From the beginnings of European literature until this century," Kirk would write, "the enduring themes of serious poetry have been those of order and permanence," especially in times of disorder.13

The belated inclusion of Eliot served another purpose as well. Eliot's essay "Tradition and the Individual Talent" allowed Kirk to resolve the difficult problem of the relationship between individual freedom and the claims the larger society. Frank Meyer, for example, thought that however much Kirk professed to favor individual freedom rather than oppression, he in fact desired a form of "status society." Thus, Kirk's thought, "stripped of its pretensions, is, sad to say, but another guise for the collectivist spirit of the age."14 In The Conservative Mind, by opining with Burke that "the individual is foolish but the species is wise," Kirklent some credence to this charge. But as he developed his conservative vision, Kirk clearly moved away from this view. He came instead to adopt Eliot's understanding that a tradition is only living when it is used and adopted by individuals acting within a culture.

Moreover, an appreciation for the individual is implicit in the text of *The Conservative Mind* itself. The book is, after all, a study of particular individuals rather than an account of abstract ideas. Kirk made this emphasis more explicit in his later histori-

cal writings, adopting John Lukacs' "participatory history," which mingles objectivity and subjectivity in the creation of historical knowledge by placing the individual's depiction of reality at the center of the historical imagination. Kirk came to believe that "historical consciousness necessarily is entwined with the mystery of personal consciousness, and involves not only history, but also psychology and philosophy." In his study of Eliot, he would write that "our present private condition and knowledge depend upon what we were yesterday, a year ago, a decade gone; if we reject the

lessons of our personal past, we cannot subsist for another hour." ¹⁶ Because of the necessity of individual action, history becomes infused with a moral purpose that is absent if the historical process is external to its participants.

John Crowe Ransom identified a more central issue for Kirk to resolve: "the badge the conservative wears must have two faces. One is resistance to

the new event; this is the fighting face.... The other is acceptance after the event, permitting the expectation that when once the new ways are shaken down and become old ways they too will be loved."17 Lewis found this pattern of resistance to, and subsequent acceptance of, change to be the "weakness of logic characteristic of all conservative thought: it erects a philosophy which must oppose fundamental change and then, when change has been affected by the operation of social-cultural factors, it proceeds to incorporate its compelled accommodation to the new facts as an example of the remarkable wisdom of willing concession."18 Here the reviewers were trying to place Kirk in a

Catch-22: If he acknowledged the conservative acceptance of change, he would become a mere temporizer; if, instead, he repaired to eternal principles he would be a mere reactionary. Karl Mannheim provided the most detailed account of this dilemma of conservatism in his essay "Conservative Thought," which appeared in the same year as *The Conservative Mind*. ¹⁹

The reviews also expressed a sometimes thinly-disguised disdain for the conservative temperament. Lewis called this Kirk's "impassioned nostalgia for a dead society and a clever contempt for all the schools of

> political thought" attempting to deal with current problems. Conservatism is a sort of mental defect, hostile to the modern world and holding on to lost certainties without any basis for doing so. The Conservative Mind for Wheeler "soothes [the] pent-up injury, forlornness and frustration" of those conservatives who are left behind by modern life.20 In America, this

claim was most forcefully advanced by Richard Hofstadter, who thought conservatism reflected a "paranoid style."

In Karl Mannheim's account of the conservative dilemma, conservatism arose as a reaction to the modern world, and that reaction is expressed as a class struggle. Mannheim argued that while "traditionalism" is a permanent psychological trait, conservatism is a definable social phenomenon that emerges only when societies are confronted by massive change. Specifically, "traditionalism can only become conservatism in a society in which change occurs through the medium of class conflict—in a



class society. This is the sociological background of modern conservatism."²¹

In his 1957 article "Conservatism as an Ideology," a young Samuel Huntington took Mannheim one step further and divided conservatism into three categories: the situational, the aristocratic, and the autonomous. He concluded that only situational conservatism could have any lasting power. Such a conservatism is "that system of ideas employed to justify any established social order...against any fundamental challenge to its nature or being."22 An aristocratic conservative was a mere reactionary; a conservative holding to "autonomous" truths against present circumstances really was no conservative at all. In Huntington's reading, Kirk was an "autonomous" conservative who sought to turn back the clock in the name of "a strained, sentimental, nostalgic, antiquarian longing for a society which is past. [Kirk] and his associates are out of tune and out of step in modern America."23

A true conservatism, for Huntington, "appears only when the challengers to...established institutions reject the fundamentals" of those institutions.24 Once that challenge passes, conservatism too disappears. In Huntington's view, the fundamental American social order is a liberal one. Conservatism emerges occasionally as a shield to protect the liberal, because liberalism cannot generate sufficient loyalty to guarantee its own survival. "In preserving the achievements of American liberalism. American liberals have no recourse but to turn to conservatism."25 Ralph Gilbert Ross made the same point, claiming that "[w]hen conservatives ask what, basically, they want to conserve, one of the first things they should think of is the liberal tradition."26

Explicitly drawing upon Mannheim, Jerry Muller has stated in a recent edited anthology that "conservatism as an articulated intellectual position only arises when the legitimacy of existing institutions can no longer be taken for granted, either because those institutions are under ideological attack or because of social, political and cultural developments that tend to undermine their authority or their functioning."27 Those "autonomous" conservatives who believe in enduring truths, Muller contends, are only fooling their readers, or perhaps themselves. Consequently, "historical utilitarianism" becomes for Muller the cornerstone of conservative thought: conservatives preserve what works, and generate the reasons for preservation later. Because Kirk's emphasis on an evocative and imaginative construction of conservatism does not fit within the Mannheim typology, Muller does not include any of Kirk's work in his anthology.

Kirk was no "situational" conservative, nor any mere defender of the achievements of liberalism. The Conservative Mind was (in the words of historian George Nash) an "all-out assault" on almost every existing liberal policy or position.²⁸ Were Kirk a situational conservative, he would not have assumed liberalism could not be salvaged, as he did from the 1950s. In an early essay, "The Dissolution of Liberalism," he concluded that liberalism was moribund from the beginning, "for lack of a higher imagination."29 Because it lacked any real narrative power, liberalism could not hold the popular imagination; liberalism soon "ceased to signify anything, even among its most sincere partisans, [other] than a vague good will."30 Kirk held this opinion in the Eisenhower years, even before the cultural revolutions of the 1960s and the rise of the New Left. And unlike Lionel Trilling, Kirk did not see socialism or a degraded mass culture as the only alternatives.31

Kirk's essay, "The Books of Conservatism," speaks to the question of criteria for judging historical change and is his answer to Mannheim and Muller. Kirk distinguishes conservatism from reaction in that "the conservative hopes to reconcile what is most important in old customs with the change that any society must experience if it is to endure.... [While] the reactionary desires a return to conditions of an earlier period." In other words, the reactionary is himself an ideologue. The reviewers of The Conservative Mind could not see a way for conservatives to avoid the charge of hypocrisy, first opposing change but then acquiescing to it. But to demand an unconditional return to a former "golden age" is itself a species of ideology, one which Kirk rejected. The past can never be known fully, as he knew from Lukacs; nor, as the liberal reformers thought, can a perfect future be predicted. The criterion for conservative reform is what can be preserved under the circumstances, not what change has been accepted.

Huntington's view notwithstanding, Kirk was not really an "autonomous" conservative either. While the relationship between Kirk and natural law thinking is complex and changed over time, he did not believe that the natural law was necessarily instantiated in particular social arrangements that had to be preserved, come what may.³² The natural law's primary function is to guide individuals in accord with right reason, Kirk thought; it is only secondarily a blueprint for positive law. "Natural law is not a harsh code that we thrust upon other people: rather it is an ethical knowledge" employed to restrain will and appetite on the individual level.33

Kirk considered figures like Abraham Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson to be conservatives, and he did not advocate a return to an aristocratic form of government—at least not in America, which had never known such a social form.³⁴ Lincoln he praised quite explicitly: "For the first time, we see a man from the common clay as defender of order."³⁵ Present-day conservatives, he thought, needed to devise "other instru-

ments and methods" to defend order and not rely on what worked for Burke or other earlier conservatives.36 In light of Kirk's clearly stated position, the reviewers' speculations about Kirk's "medievalism" or his idolatry of the eighteenth-century appear deeply mistaken. The typical caricature of Kirk as an ersatz eighteenth-century country squire is belied by his own expressed distaste for a century he described as "an age of gilded selfishness and frivolous intellectuality—an age almost without a heart."37 Indeed, Burke was a conservative hero to Kirk precisely because he was "essentially a modern man, and his concern was with our modern complexities" in a way that (for example) Bolingbroke was not.38

In contrast to the Mannheim/Huntington model, which viewed conservatives as a necessary but temporary evil, Richard Hofstadter believed the new conservatives of the 1950s were actively dangerous to the social order. In his 1965 book, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, he famously described conservatives, the main exponents of the "paranoid style," as afflicted with debilitating status anxiety. Hofstadter's study was only the best known of a number of analyses in the 1960s that sought to trace conservatism to an "authoritarian personality," interpreting it as a kind of mental illness.39 Both old-line WASP families and new immigrants were insecure in postwar America, leading them to lash out at others and credit conspiracies directed against their way of life. What Hofstadter called the "ultra-conservatives" were animated by "a rather profound if largely unconscious hatred of our society and its ways;" they were characterized by a "restlessness, suspicion and fear."40

This understanding of the conservative temperament continues today: consider, for example, the media caricature of evangelical Christians as poor and easily led. Rogers Smith of Yale, in an important article arguing for an appreciation of America's "multiple traditions," nevertheless describes the conservative traditions as promoting "[r]acial, nativist, and religious tensions...as the Buchanan and Duke campaigns, the Christian Coalition, the Los Angeles riots, the English-only agitation [and] renewed patterns of racial segregation" illustrate. He judges the conservative traditions "so irreparably different and dangerous that they do not merit equal status in the political community."⁴¹

But Kirk was not a representative of any paranoid style. In "Conservatives and Fantastics," he directly criticized the radical elements of the nascent conservative movement, such as the John Birch Society. The "freaks, charlatans, profiteers and foolish enthusiasts," while at times borrowing (or being given) the conservative label, must be distinguished from conservatism proper.42 And far from suffering status anxiety, Kirk seemed supremely confident as a conservative spokesman, living happily far away from urban centers in his ancestral home in rural Michigan. Kirk's humble and contented way of life was a direct contradiction to the Hofstadter thesis that "conservatism has much to do with the selfish possession of wealth and power and little to do with moral purpose, much less Christian love."43

Moreover, Kirk contended, there was little genuine evidence for the "authoritarian personality" thesis. The contributors to collections such as *The New American Right* (which included Hofstadter, David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, among others) attempted to fit everyone with whom they disagreed, from "old American families, Irish, Germans, Catholics, Protestants [and] Jews" into their search for the "New American Right." While "ingenious," these descriptions for Kirk were "thoroughly unconvincing." There was nothing to unite

these disparate groups except for the contributors' dislike of them.

Neither a Mannheim-inspired understanding of conservatism as the defense of liberalism nor a Hofstadter-based claim that conservatism is nothing more than a social pathology does justice to the task Kirk set for himself in The Conservative Mind. So what was it that Kirk was attempting? David Frum, in a recent assessment of Kirk, provides a clue. He writes that "Russell Kirk inspired the conservative movement by pulling together a series of only partially related ideas and events into a coherent narrative.... Kirk did not record the past; he created it."45 Earlier, in 1989, J. David Hoeveler, Jr. described conservatism as "that quality of imagination and insight, of historical memory, of awe, of sympathy, that makes the empirical data of life something more—a habitable world, an inner environment that is personal and familiar."46 The Conservative Mindwas Kirk's first largescale attempt to use imagination in the service of historical memory.

Consequently, *The Conservative Mind* was not the linear, deductive treatise on conservatism that some were expecting. It was, as Kirk later said, an "historical analysis of a mode of regarding the civil social order." *The Conservative Mind* created, as Nash noted, a "genealogy" from which conservatives could draw. In faulting Kirk for creating a tradition that was not really there, the critics radically misunderstand his achievement. The dichotomy between a "true" and a "false" conservatism that the reviewers focused on indulges precisely the liberal abstraction that *The Conservative Mind* avoids.

Bernard Crick thought that Kirk was in an intellectual quandary because, "[h] aving no significant conservative tradition, Americans are put to the unconservative task of inventing one." But invention need not be antithetical to conservatism. From his studies of Burke, Disraeli, Eliot, and others, Kirk believed that tradition always partakes of invention. Facts have no life of their own: it is imagination that makes tradition out of history. The narrative of conservatism that he composed was itself an embodiment of the imagination that became the touchstone of his conservatism.

The imagination is not primarily rational, but embraces the feelings and affections; it is something outside the individual, but which (in Burke's words) the individual "owns" and "ratifies;" it is not based upon calculation; and it is something in addition to the physical realities of our "shivering nature." While its core remains the same, it must be "expressed afresh from age to age," primarily through literature and art, but also through political statesmanship. ⁴⁹ The imagination, moreover, is always present; the only question for Kirk is whether the imagination will be respected and employed, or ignored.

Kirk thought that a return to the imagination was a crucial step in the recreation of cultural order. "Whether to throw away yesterday's nonsense to embrace tomorrow's nonsense, or whether we find our way out of superficiality into real meaning, must depend in part upon the images which we discover or shape."50 Kirk identified several authors as inspiring this strand of modernity-critique: Max Picard, Gustave Thibon, and Charles Baudouin.51 The now unknown Baudouin, for example, in The Myth of Modernity, demolished the false objectivity of the modern world: "To believe what we see is a view of reality is a naiveté of which only 'modern man' is capable. In short, although they repudiate the superstition of the word, our contemporaries accept without flinching the superstition of the fact, which is no less deceptive."52

In a pair of prescient essays, written not long after *The Conservative Mind*, Kirk viv-

idly describes a coming "Age of Sentiments," dominated by the Image, which will displace the modern "Age of Discussion," characterized by a love of rational argument and the tyranny of the Fact. The Age of Discussion "broke the cake of custom in Christendom...engulfed Burke's prejudice and prescription [and] subverted men's ancient reluctance to abandon the ways of their ancestors." In the new age

[t]he immense majority of human beings will *feel* with the projected images they behold upon the television screen; and in those viewers that screen will rouse *sentiments* rather than reflections. Waves of emotion will sweep back and forth, so long as the Age of Sentiments endures. And whether those emotions are low or high must depend upon the folk who determine the tone and temper of television programming.⁵⁵

That is, the emotions will depend on the quality of imagination that stirs them. But while Kirk was no unqualified admirer of the Age of Sentiments, he did not despair about its arrival: "[f]or the most part, the Age of Discussion was an age of shams and posturings."56 Like its fruit, liberalism, Discussion lacked "vitality." Mired in abstractions and endless argument over first principles, or indeed, whether there were any such principles, rejecting authority and tradition, it failed to move hearts. The conservative imagination, however, could be fitted to survive where liberalism could not. What conservatives needed was a "deliberate revival of the concept of traditional wisdom," which would survive the end of the Age of Discussion.57

Such an alternative vision has some claim to being called "postmodern." The controversy over postmodernism—its definitions, future, and merits—would at first blush seem to have little to do with traditionalist conservatism. Postmodern figures have distinguished themselves in their devotion to obscure and abstract reasoning and leftist

political causes. Nevertheless, as early as 1982, Kirk suggested that "the Post-Modern imagination stands ready to be captured. And the seemingly novel ideas and sentiments and modes may turn out, after all, to be received truths and institutions, well known to surviving conservatives."⁵⁸

Though himself implacably hostile to postmodernism, E. Christian Kopffhas perceptively described Kirk's postmodern affinities. "Kirk presented America with an attitude, a style, a persona." He quotes Kirk as asking, "What are you and I? ... In large part we are what we imagine ourselves to be. William Butler Yeats advises us to clap masks to our faces and play our appropriate part: the image becomes reality."59 Even the carefully constructed image of Kirk as an eighteenth-century gentlemen, living a life of letters in a rural "Victorian villa, furnished with furniture salvaged from old hotels and churches," is evocative of the postmodern propensity for self-creation. 60

The connections between post-modernism and conservatism in fact run deep.61 One of the earliest uses of the term is attributed to Bernard Iddings Bell, the Episcopal canon whom Kirk admired. In his 1926 book, Postmodernism, Bell was already predicting the collapse of modernity. Modernity was born in the destruction of belief in the infallibility of the Bible through the new scripture scholarship. The book of nature became the new holy writ. Now, the individual intellect could perceive the infallible laws of nature and divine the form and structure of the universe, and eventually, the principles of society and moral conduct. But science operates only within the frame of the measurable; it cannot answer "why" anything is. Bell called for a return to religion, in a "postmodern" form, grounded in the Incarnation and receptive to miracles. "The time would seem to be at hand for a new school of religious aspirants, one in accord not with the prejudices of scientists of a generation ago, but rather consonant with the convictions of scientists today. Fundamentalism is hopelessly outdated. Modernism has ceased to be modern. We are ready for some sort of Postmodernism."⁶²

Some conservative writers have already begun to follow this lead.⁶³ Vigen Guroian has drawn out the connections between Kirk and what Guroian calls the "postmodern" Eliot.64 David Walsh, in his Guarded by Mystery: Meaning in a Postmodern Age attempts to ground postmodern thought in a new understanding of the transcendent, which, Walsh argues had been lost—but not rejected—by modernity.65 And Peter Augustine Lawler, in his recent book Postmodernism Rightly Understood, sets out a conservative postmodern tradition that he argues is fully in accord with the larger Western philosophical tradition. Lawler describes postmodernism "rightly understood" as a rejection of "modern rationalism or science, and to some extent rationalism simply, for their futile attempt to eradicate the mystery of being, particularly human being."66

Even if Kirk would not fully adopt any of the current versions of postmodernism, conservatism and the conservative imagination have contributions to make to the postmodern age. Eugene Genovese has characterized modernity as presenting a unique "difficulty to conservatism," because "[t]houghtful conservatives know that they plunge into difficulty whenever they become aware of themselves as conservative." In order to defend what they thought was worth conserving, conservatives believed that they had to engage liberalism on its own terms, in a "dialectical" mode that presupposes a "collective of propositions, a logic" that is foreign to the rhetorical, didactic, and imaginative modes more amenable to conservative expression.⁶⁷ This capitulation to liberalism, has, according to James Kalb, failed to produce any significant defense of conservative thought. Instead, conservatism cannot even present its positions in a persuasive way because conservatives "cannot even talk...in language very different from that of triumphant liberalism."

In retrospect, the weakest part of Kirk's book is the most quoted: Kirk's famous "canons" of conservatism. Such a catalogue played right into the hands of Huntington and others, who thought they exemplified a conservative abstraction at odds with the historical texture of the remainder of Kirk's account. Lewis concentrated on this precise point: "any attempt to build philosophic foundations for [the conservative] attitude is invariably evidence that the attitude no longer claims the instinctive allegiance" of the culture; "far too much of genuine conservatism...is a matter of feeling and instinct and emotion to be satisfactorily reducible to the forms of logical assertion and proof."69 Although Kirk never renounced the canons, they continued to change; by his last books, there were ten, but in newer editions of The Conservative Mind, Kirk admonished that "if one seeks by definition more than this, the sooner [one] turns to individual thinkers, the surer ground [one] is on."70 Rather than continue to push these abstract canons, Kirk stressed other themes implicit in The Conservative Mind, such as the imagination, which is not mentioned among the canons.

Now that liberalism has died in all but the most recalcitrant corners, the project begun with *The Conservative Mind* more fully comes into focus. Postmodernism has reintroduced sentiment, contingency, locality and imagination into social discourse, which are the areas that occupied much of Kirk's work. In *The Conservative Mind*, Kirk attempted to create a conservative mood rather than an ideological program, and the

alternative language he created for conceiving the conservative program remains the most viable in the post-liberal age.

Mystery lay at the heart of Kirk's understanding of the conservative temperament. There is the mystery of free will, of individual choice, of divine Providence, and of the creation and sustaining of tradition. Modernity denigrated mystery in the name of a scientific or politically revolutionary meta-narrative, but "modernity has not discovered convincing answers to the questions that these myths raise; rather, modernity has endeavored to shrug away the profound lessons that lie implicit in these myths."71 The postmodernists, on the other hand, while recognizing mystery, too often use it only as an opportunity for an endless play of meaningless word games. Conservatives, in contrast, keep a healthy respect for the irreducible core of human experience that must be expressed in ways other than through reason: "Tenebrae are woven into human nature, whatever the meliorists say."72 Through his imaginative recreation in *The Conservative Mind* of a tradition that could find a home in a postliberal era, Kirk helped illumine the shadows surrounding the mysteries of life.

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
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