Sparta’s Sicilian Proxy War: The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta, 418-413 B.C.
By Paul A. Rahe.
Encounter Books, 2023.
Hardcover, 376 pages, $34.99.
Reviewed by David Talcott.
“In their haste to identify a formula for politics that would be applicable to all circumstances and all men, the modern thinkers tended to forget and obscure the lessons Aristotle had so carefully taught concerning the essential diversity of human societies and the indispensability of prudent statesmanship.” – Carnes Lord, Introduction to Aristotle’s Politics, 24.
This work constitutes the fifth book in an ongoing series in which Paul Rahe analyzes the international affairs of classical Sparta by re-envisioning the great fifth-century conflicts through a Spartan lens. His goal seems to be nothing less than the complete demolition of the dominant “realist” paradigm in contemporary foreign policy. Through his extensive analysis of classical Sparta, Rahe shows that nations do not act on the international stage out of a uniform desire to project power, but instead act in ways that spring from their nation’s character and conception of a good life. This fifth volume constitutes a valuable contribution to his project by carefully analyzing Athens’ famous “Sicilian Expedition” in 415 B.C. In this work, he demonstrates how the distinctive character of the Spartan and Athenian regimes was manifested in crucially different ways in that event, much to the downfall of Athens. This series constitutes a stunning accomplishment by Rahe, containing valuable lessons for statesmen, diplomats, and educated citizens of every stripe. As American leaders grapple with a failing Russia and an ascendant China, the Sicilian Expedition is rife with practical application.
When first approaching these books, one should brush up on ancient Greek geography. And, by brush up, I mean be prepared to google a wide range of names, for from the first pages, Rahe assumes you can distinguish between Arcadia and Achaea, Boeotia and Euboea, Chalsis and Cynouria. The many useful maps help orient the reader, but quite a bit of knowledge is still taken for granted. Likewise, readers unfamiliar with the Persian or Peloponnesian wars are liable to be bowled over at the depth of discussion in Rahe’s account, who not only narrates the main events but also evaluates the veracity of various reports of the events in antiquity. Those familiar with Herodotus and Thucydides will have an easier time with Rahe’s series than most other readers. He pulls no punches on the details. However, regardless of whether or not one is familiar with the basic outlines or whether one has read Rahe’s earlier works, this particular volume is a reasonable entrée into the entire series because of its extensive, 46-page prologue. This prologue provides an overview of Rahe’s entire project up to this point and is worth the price of the book all by itself.
To see why “realism” is inadequate as a paradigm, Rahe seeks to rehabilitate the old idea of grand strategy as crucial for the competent study of international affairs. Instead of considering merely the military capabilities or the power dynamics in play, the grand strategist thinks about nations as integrated wholes, considering also their economic and especially their moral situation. Quoting from J.F.C. Fuller, Rahe writes, “The grand strategist must understand the moral characteristics of his countrymen, their history, peculiarities, social customs and system of government, for all these quantities and qualities form the pillars of the military arch which it is his duty to construct.” As a result, the way that nations fight and conduct themselves internationally is different depending on the character of the people living under each regime. The series as a whole is a demonstration that this is so. Rahe initiated his series of books with this goal in mind, writing in his first volume nearly ten years ago that it was intended as “the prelude to a projected trilogy on the grand strategy of Ancient Lacedaemon” (Paul Rahe, The Spartan Regime, xii). Understanding that strategy—its successes, failures, and modifications—guides Rahe’s writing. He traces it from Sparta’s founding long before the Persian Wars to its applications and modifications through the 400s and its war with Athens.
Spartan enslavement of the helots is well-known, but Rahe’s analysis convincingly shows that this unusual arrangement has spillover effects not only on domestic politics but also on foreign affairs. Spartan men were not allowed to work the trades or to farm, leaving such labor to their slaves and to the “perioikoi”—the people who lived in the villages around Sparta. Instead, Spartan men were to train for greatness—militarily, of course, but also ethically as the means to that military victory. Spartan greatness required personal courage for the strain of battle and a thoroughgoing piety in reverence to the gods and the laws of the city. The men exercised themselves in these things daily so that when war was necessary, their strength would rejoice in the challenge. Indeed, going out to war was a kind of holiday for them, a break from the strain of training and discipline that were the commonplace of daily life. Freed from agricultural and industrial toil, the Spartan men lived as a virtue-seeking aristocratic brotherhood of equals.
This distinctive way of life leads to a distinctive grand strategy and foreign policy, one that is contrary to the stereotype of militaristic nations. Rather than seeking world domination, Sparta was passive on the international scene, unadventurous, and generally unwilling to stray far from home. Instead of seeking to project power outside of their region, they were content in the Peloponnese. Their needs were well provided for, and their way of life did not require many grand things. They were not building big houses, importing fine clothes and perfumes, or serving a god who claimed the entire world as his own. They were content as long as the helots stayed enslaved and no great powers threatened their area. Thus, their militaristic regime was aimed at maintaining a merely regional hegemony. There was, at first, no need for adventuring abroad. They lived in simple homes and sang simple songs; their glory was their character and courage.
Rahe convincingly shows how a series of events in the 400s forced modifications to this grand strategy, first to counter the colossal threat of Persia, and then later to counter the ambitions of Athens. The threat of Persian invasion goaded the Spartans into sending their armies abroad in exceptional ways. If Persia rolled up all of Greece, Sparta would not be able to stand alone against them. Thus, an alliance with Athens and other nations was in their interest, an alliance in which they took the lead as the acknowledged military experts. After Persia was defeated at Salamis and Plataea, the Spartans would have been content to retreat into their regional stability. But, Athenian expansionism eventually goaded them into another unlooked-for foreign war. Interestingly, Rahe places the key moment of this latter shift not at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, but part way through it at the battle of Mantineia in 418. The alarm from the near-cataclysm of that battle, he argues, compelled Sparta to shift its posture toward Athens from mere containment to active destruction. Until that time, Sparta was content to harass and harry Athens, but from that point forward they sought positively to cripple them through offensive warfare. To see his fuller argument for this claim, see chapter eight of his book Sparta’s Second Attic War.
Here the Sicilian misadventure comes into the story. Athens had meddled in Sicilian affairs several times in the 400s, seeking to expand their commercial empire. In 415, during a lull in their conflict with Sparta, it seemed like the time was again ripe for Athens to make a splash, challenging Syracuse, the leading city of Sicily, for supremacy in the region. Though warned against the expedition by the elder general Nicias, the Athenians doubled down and sent a grand armada. Over the next two years, Athens committed, and lost, 160 triremes and over 25% of her adult male population.
Unlike Sparta, Athens was thoroughly democratic, commercial, and sea-faring. To maintain their vast fleet, they needed imported goods and extorted funds. Though Rahe does not deeply discuss the structure of the Athenian regime, perhaps assuming its basic outline is known well enough, he repeatedly draws on speeches in Thucydides to show their spirited impetulence. A speech from Book I says of the Athenians, “they are daring beyond their strength, they are risk-takers against all judgment, and in the midst of terrors they remain of good hope…they are always out and about in the larger world.” Thus, unlike the Spartans, they are eager and willing to go abroad in order to compete for greatness. Because of this yearning, Athens is vulnerable to the “erotic” allure (Thucydides’ term) of what could be accomplished by taking Syracuse and Sicily. They have no helots at home nor a static hegemony. They have unrestrained passion. Theirs is the ambition to acquire and possess.
Faced with a nearby dangerous adversary, Athens never should have committed such a startling amount of manpower and money so far abroad as Sicily. A well-populated land far from home proves a logistical nightmare to conquer. Maintaining that army in the field is costly, even apart from the lost opportunity cost at home and the danger of an enemy striking elsewhere. Sparta cunningly allowed the Sicilians to fight as proxies, supplying them only with the smallest of leadership teams (just one Spartan general) and committing none of their own troops to the fight. In the end, Athens wasted years of money and a great deal of manpower in an endeavor that was tenuous from the start. Just as they had done several generations earlier in their attempt to conquer Egypt, they overreached. Their democratic belly was larger than their arms could manage.
Athens and Sparta were not the same and did not act the same on the international stage. Likewise, nations today are not the same, and we will fail to understand international politics if we fail to analyze different regimes to uncover what they honor and what they love. In his appendix in defense of grand strategy Rahe warns, “When forecasting how another polity is likely to act, no statesman should, as the realist recommends, leave out of his calculus considerations of honor and advantage—for, in deciding what is to be done, neither he nor any other statesman will, in fact, ignore the dictates of honor and advantage, as they are understood within the regime each heads.” The character of the regime and the character of its people in large part determine how they will act on the international stage.
David Talcott is a Fellow of Philosophy and the Graduate Dean at New Saint Andrews College. His publications have appeared in Public Discourse, Eikon: A Journal of Biblical Anthropology, Human Life Review, and First Things online. His most recent book is Plato, published by P&R Publishing.
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