Climate and Energy: The Case for Realism
Edited by E. Calvin Beisner and David R. Legates.
Regnery Publishing, 2024.
Hardcover, 480 pages, $29.99.
Reviewed by Joshua J. Bowman.
Calvin Beisner and David Legates’s edited volume, Climate and Energy, seeks to bring much-needed nuance to the public discussion of climate change, operating under the label of “climate realism.” Unlike other books critiquing modern climate alarmism, the authors of these sixteen chapters are far less preoccupied with conspiratorial speculation and partisan talking points. They exhibit greater humility and caution, and they want the scientific information to speak for itself. The authors value human dignity and want to ease the fears of those who see climate change as an existential threat to human life. Indeed, by the end of the book, misinformation and modern climate policy are shown to pose a far greater risk to humanity and the environment than climate change itself.
The authors also do not deny the existence of anthropogenic global warming or climate change as such. They simply reject that narrative of catastrophic anthropogenic climate change in which extreme mitigation efforts and panic are preferred over modest adaptation and innovation. In the worlds of politics, media, and academia, however, these are distinctions without a difference. One is either anxious about future climate change or a “secular heretic” against “the science.”
Several chapters address a key element or variable in the debate about climate change and related energy questions. Their authors highlight what is known, unknown, and potentially unknowable in explaining the role of the sun, oceans and ocean currents, and clouds for example. We also learn of unintended consequences, neglected variables, variables that resist quantification, and a remarkable tendency toward reductionist thinking on all sides of the debate.
Roy Spencer, in chapter three, offers a clarifying look at what exactly we mean by the term climate. Climate is not weather. Instead, “[t]he word ‘climate’ is understood in science to mean the thirty-year average of a meteorological variable such as temperature, precipitation, humidity, and so forth, taken at a location over a seasonal time window.” One absurdly warm winter, dry spring, or snowy autumn does not necessarily indicate a change in climate, and because of all the variables involved in a given place over any period of time, there is considerable room for variation.
Spencer also reframes the way we think of global climate in terms of energy: how it’s absorbed, lost, gained, distributed, and so on. To understand this energy distribution and activity (energy “flows”), computer modeling is necessary. There are simply too many variables and measurements over time to make meaningful observations without advanced technology. When describing current and past conditions, computer modeling can be quite helpful since temperatures and rates of precipitation, for example, are relatively easy to measure.
One of the key exceptions to the list of measurable variables is clouds, which—depending on altitude, thickness, and surface area—may amplify or reduce warming. “Generally speaking,” however, “clouds cannot be included explicitly in computerized climate models because computers are nowhere near fast enough to resolve their fine structure.” Instead, computers make an informed “guess” about the clouds’ impact using information from other variables, such as precipitation. The issue of clouds and precipitation is no small matter because about “75 percent of the greenhouse effect” is accounted for by water vapor (including clouds). Yet, scientists understand the “micro-physics” of precipitation far less than is often realized. As computer models become more sophisticated in how they represent precipitation and clouds, scientists are finding greater uncertainty and a larger range of potential global temperatures than before. The manner in which clouds provide “feedback” and react to increases in C02 and warming, for example, remains unclear.
Nevertheless, computer models are necessary for understanding the complexity of a global climate. This modeling has improved in many ways as storage capacity and speeds increase, and we find new ways of collecting much-needed data. While we all like to joke about the futility of predicting the local weather, the reality is that meteorology has made massive strides in the last several decades (at least for forecasts up to ten days or less).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), however, does not just rely on one model. There are several used by scientists across the planet, and each one has its advantages and disadvantages. One would think, when working with such models, climate forecasters would emphasize those with the greatest track record. Astonishingly, this is not the case. Indeed, it is striking to learn how easily the IPCC Assessment Reports and National Climate Assessments can be influenced by international politics, since their authors are chosen by governments and may have only a tenuous connection to the sciences.
Beyond the reports, we can still look at the effectiveness of the thirty-two most commonly used models to see which ones accurately predict what has already happened. In other words, if we take a few decades of observed data, enter it into the models being used today, which one most accurately predicts climate conditions and change over that time? Which one most accurately represents observed, historical reality? Strikingly, “only one of the thirty-two model groups’ runs correctly simulates what has been observed. This is the Russian climate model INM-CM4, which also has the least prospective warming.” Rather than rely on this proven model and method, the reporters choose an average estimate of all the models, skewing their conclusions heavily toward more dramatic warming predicted by less accurate computer simulations.
While the purported objectivity of science and the disinterestedness of scientists themselves have long been overstated, the book exposes a troubling trend: the movement toward a “post-normal” and “post-modern” science. Most people still think of science in the “normal” fashion whereby we use the scientific method, collect data, make observations, and use deductive and inductive reasoning. Scientists develop hypotheses with varying levels of confidence, share findings, and remain open to the possibility that confidence in one’s conclusion may increase or decrease with further study. According to David Legates, there has been an alarming movement away from this “normal.”
Instead, an ethic of “post-normal” science permits scientists to proceed toward high-stakes conclusions and urgent decisions regardless of the uncertainty among experts. Indeed, post-normal science disapproves of the influence of established scientific experts because their ranks are allegedly too homogenous in terms of gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, and so on. The scientific method was far too slow, and scientific experts insufficiently diverse, for politics and policymaking. Post-normal science focuses on a more diverse and “democratic” set of peers using “extended facts – facts supplemented by individual experiences and interpretations.” Legates continues:
While the scientific method is a problem-solving exercise that is best suited for simple questions with clear-cut solutions, post-normal science is designed for complex problems with multiple causes that may not have simple or even attainable solutions. Thus, post-normal science relaxes the strict definition of facts and expertise by including subjective perceptions, interpretations, and feelings.
Rather than stick with scientific inquiry in the classical, objective sense, science that seeks to be socially and politically relevant for facing large-scale problems dispenses with facts in favor of subjective cultural values and inclusivity. In other words, one culture’s interpretation of the data could be equally valid as another’s, regardless of whether the data actually corresponds to that reality. Paradoxically, this sort of “DEI” approach to science also assists in advancing the myth of a consensus on catastrophic anthropogenic climate change:
Environmental groups embrace the post-modern science since its aim ‘is to attack the science that stands against their agenda’ and it serves to further their influence and funding opportunities…A consensus, of course, is necessary to further the post-normal and post-modern science agenda. Isn’t developing a consensus a sign of a healthy democracy?
In other words, the post-modern emphasis on subjectivity or objectivity allows those with a political agenda to claim the authority of science to advance a cause that may only have the most tenuous grasp of actual, scientific reality. This is masked as a more democratic and inclusive scientific perspective, but like J.J. Rousseau’s idea of the general will, it does not tolerate dissent. It cannot. It simply wants a bunch of people who look different to think exactly the same. Indeed, throughout the book, it is striking how those advancing the more catastrophic narrative are shown to operate with a level of groupthink characteristic of the general will. Those dissenting from alarmism must be “forced to be green,” as it were.
But Legates and others in the volume miss the possibility that the post-normal scientists may be on to something. Like Rousseau, they may be asking excellent questions and giving all the wrong answers. The “normal” and established scientist is still subject to the temptations of ideology, arrogance, and materialism. Furthermore, all scientists are human and fallen. While a level of objectivity and disinterestedness might be achievable, it cannot be absolute. Something of the scientist always ends up in their work, and especially in their interpretation. Classical science is no less prone to pride and corruption than post-normal science, but the classical perspective may be more vigilant in guarding one’s prejudices.
Science, classical or otherwise, must recognize its limitations and the inherent challenges of sinful men and women studying a fallen world. The post-normal scientists seem to recognize this, but rather than embrace the mystery and limitations, they seek to overcome them in a kind of will-to-power or will-to-reality. In such an atmosphere, the data can say whatever we want it to say if it does not offend the “consensus.”
Beisner and Legate’s book is explicitly written to persuade those who make decisions that impact environmental and energy policy and politics. These politicians and policymakers face additional pressures, though, because their constituents desire action when they are afraid, and those same individuals are likely predisposed against the book’s argument. They would have to come to the uncomfortable conclusion that their fear is based on lies and hyperbole. One can hope that readers might change their minds, but success likely depends on how entrenched the alarmism is in a reader’s imagination.
These same policy leaders also face related temptations. The fear and anxiety created by climate alarmism, and the use of “emergencies” generally, is remarkably convenient for justifying many policies. Nowadays, the powers of the Executive and Legislative branches seem to rely more on crises than on the Constitution.
This crisis mentality and alarmism have been devastating for any attempt to think clearly about energy policy and economics. Chapters 11-16 help explain the centrality of modern energy production to human flourishing and the way a great amount of prosperity relies on fossil fuels. Alternative energy sources, such as wind and solar, are nowhere near close to replacing coal, oil, and natural gas. Yet much of the alarmism around fossil fuels’ impact on climate change has resulted in policy interventions that make energy production more expensive, less reliable, and hostile to the prospects of the poor in the developing and developed world. Innovations, especially in natural gas and nuclear power, have significantly helped reduce emissions and brought affordable energy to more people. The same could be said about the prosperity afforded by an energy-rich world, which has the freedom to focus more on environmental well-being and less on basic survival. The notion that humanity must choose between a cleaner environment and economic prosperity, supported by fossil fuel energy, does not square with the data.
The book concludes with an annotated bibliography of “published, referred papers that are,” according to David Legates, “fundamental to an understanding of the science of climate change,” and which span over 128 years of research. Complete with “layman’s abstracts,” it is a treasure trove for those interested in learning more.
All in all, Beisner and Legates’s volume offers a compelling, nuanced, and non-ideological view of the science of climate change and its implications. It is an invaluable book for scientists, policy makers, students, and anyone who humbly seeks truth amidst the confusion of modern environmental thought and politics.
Joshua J. Bowman, Ph.D, is the Executive Director of the Ciceronian Society and author of Imagination and Environmental Political Thought (Lexington Books, 2018).
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