The Failure of American Conservatism and the Road Not Taken
By Claes G. Ryn.
Republic Book Publishers, 2023.
Hardcover, 468 pages, $24.95.
Reviewed by Michael Federici.
American conservatism has been plagued by an identity crisis and political failure since its birth in the middle of the twentieth century. It was then that Russell Kirk published The Conservative Mind, which gave meaning to what would become one of two major political theories in American politics. Yet, Kirk’s description of conservatism was not then, nor is it now, universally embraced by self-professed conservatives. From its inception, political and intellectual conservatism have been an amalgam of ideas and schools of thought that do not always share common theoretical ground. The rather broad use in popular media of the term conservatism, like that of liberalism, gives the impression that conservatism is a unitary set of assumptions and beliefs. Intellectual conservatism is, however, a complex and diverse phenomenon that contains competing and irreconcilable ideas.
In many instances, political conservatism was a marriage of convenience between those who opposed communism, the growth of the welfare state, and progressive liberalism’s erosion of limited government. Generally speaking, conservatives agreed that economic markets should be relatively free of government regulation, that communism was a threat to national security and liberty, and that American political conduct in the twentieth century increasingly deviated from the Constitution. Conservatives took to politics to promote deregulation, increase defense spending, and return to the original intent of the Constitution’s framers. At the urging of William F. Buckley’s National Review, the conservative movement fused several types of conservatives—libertarians, evangelical Christians, populists, traditionalists, moderate Republicans, and neoconservatives—to build a political coalition that would win elections and implement conservative public policies. While the Cold War raged and the welfare state grew, these variegated forms of conservatism shared common political ground that disguised and muted underlying philosophical differences. After significant election victories, the hoped-for changes to the conduct of American politics fell far short of expectations. With the fall of communism, differences between conservative factions became more apparent and amplified. Political conservatism became unfused. As a consequence, the very meaning and identity of conservatism was open for debate, and it lost its political bearings as it fractured into competing factions. According to Claes G. Ryn, American conservatism’s failure is partly attributed to its “pseudo-pragmatism” that sacrificed philosophical depth for short-term political advantage.
Few conservative thinkers are as well situated as Ryn, an emeritus professor of politics at The Catholic University of America, to make sense of conservatism’s meaning, evolution, and prospects. He came of political age as the conservative movement was taking shape in post-WWII America, and he has been analyzing and commenting on its developments for decades. In that span of time, Ryn’s writings broadened and deepened the meaning of conservatism and politics, which he criticized American conservatives for not doing. The Failure of American Conservatism and the Road Not Taken is a collection of new and previously published writings about the meaning of conservatism and its failure to meet the historical and cultural challenges of twentieth and twenty-first-century America. Ryn has cautioned against identifying conservatism with ideas and brands of politics that are antithetical to philosophical realism, historical consciousness, preservation of the American tradition, and what he calls constitutional personality, the character necessary to create and conduct constitutional politics. Ryn’s analysis of American conservatism leads to several essential points that stem from his conclusion that intellectual conservatism tends to be philosophically inadequate and prone to reductionist, ideological thinking.
Ryn begins his analysis of conservatism with an observation about the human condition that was instrumental to the formation of American constitutionalism in the eighteenth century. Human beings are fallen and imperfect. Human existence is difficult and complex. Navigating social, economic, and political life in a way that is consistent with high aspirations like justice, community, social harmony, and happiness is difficult. Humans need the assistance of deep and serious philosophy to find their way in complex life. They are prone to take shortcuts and be reductionistic when it comes to understanding life as it is. One such shortcut, common to many conservatives, is the tendency to conceive of politics without considering the needs of the ethical life.[1] Ryn notes, however, that any theory of politics is highly lacking if it ignores the “moral-spiritual dimension of human existence.” Ideology provides simple ways of understanding politics that eliminate the difficult work of philosophy. The danger of ideology is that it does not comport with but truncates reality and leads to imprudent if not disastrous political outcomes. Ryn does not take sides in the ideological wars but urges conservatives to reject ideology altogether and to engage in deeper philosophical thinking. Philosophy does the opposite of ideology. It recognizes complexity and gropes toward a deeper understanding of reality that builds on the insights of previous thinkers. There are no final answers in true philosophy. There are insights that provide a deeper but not complete understanding. Final political solutions born from ideology are anathema to genuine philosophy; the latter inoculates human beings from the former. Moreover, monistic, ideological thinking is inconsistent with constitutional politics, which requires compromise and consensus.
Conservatives, generally, have neglected not only serious philosophy but also the health of American culture, abdicating its stewardship to liberals and radicals who have been more than happy to shape it in ways that promote and fuel their political vision. The political left has been able to dominate cultural institutions like the university, Hollywood, and the arts because conservatives—following a pseudo-pragmatism—were preoccupied with election politics and public policy and inclined to believe that culture, including the humanities, has little to do with politics. Conservatives wonder why their political success has not resulted in more substantial changes to economic, social, and political life. Ryn suggests that without attention to the cultural foundations of politics, political victories are essentially hollow and short-lived. Politics is subordinate to culture. Movement conservatives who were focused on immediate political advantage failed to see the vital connections between political conduct and outcomes and cultural forces that influence human behavior. Long-term changes to American civilization require a reorientation of how individuals conceive and perceive the true, the good, and the beautiful.
Political thinking and conduct move with the cultural current that is directed by what Ryn calls “imaginative and intellectual masterminds,” individuals of powerful vision who spread their intuitions and ideas through the culture in the form of philosophical works, textbooks, novels, films, television, newspapers, advertising, social media, religious sermons, school curricula, and college courses. These aspects of American culture are the trenches in which competing masterminds fight for the hearts, minds, and imaginations of Americans. Conservatives have been reluctant to get into the cultural trenches and do battle. In some cases, they have advised a cultural retreat in the hopes that at some future time, they will be in a better position to restore traditional culture. What is more typical of conservatives is not a long-term strategy but an ardent belief that election politics and public policy are the immediate path to changing the direction of American civilization. In Ryn’s view, capturing people’s minds and imaginations is more important in the current circumstances than capturing seats in legislatures, on judicial benches, or in executive offices. Politics is limited by what the culture will tolerate and support. Winning control of political institutions will not necessarily lead to an ability to change the direction of society. In the case of conservatives, deregulating the economy, returning to fiscal responsibility, building a strong national defense, and restoring limited government become feasible once the moral imagination has been enlivened. As long as the progressive imagination is pervasive, conservative political reforms stand little chance of success.
Ryn also argues that the failure of conservatives to engage in serious philosophical work has resulted in conservatism becoming more ideological than philosophical. Conservatism avoids ideology when it recognizes that abstract, ahistorical principles and theories are inconsistent with and destructive to American and Western civilization. Yet, some conservatives have rejected a philosophical conservatism in favor of ideological conservatism, a counterfeit conservatism imbued with idealistic assumptions about human nature and politics. Examples include both neoconservatives and libertarians. The former are similar to liberal internationalists who follow Woodrow Wilson’s vision of a peaceful world of democratic nation states governed by an international system that promotes universal human rights and free trade. Such idealistic conceptions of international politics ignore the realities of American and international politics, and they are largely ignorant of the cultural and historical prerequisites of constitutional democracy. The failed American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are examples of what happens when policymakers ignore the cultural origins of politics. Ryn sees in neoconservatism’s idealism similarities to the French Revolution’s Jacobins who also promoted global democracy and universal human rights as components of a universal ideology that eviscerates particular cultures.
Neoconservatives promote the ideology of American empire. They aim to spread American political institutions across the globe and accomplish American hegemony. Such policies are pursued as American political institutions degenerate at home. American democracy and constitutionalism are not exportable because they were historically and organically derived in a particular culture. Nations have unique histories and cultures that may or may not be suited to constitutional democracy. Neoconservatives largely ignore the problem of cultural and historical compatibility because they are convinced, like the original Jacobins, that all human beings desire democracy and human rights.
Ryn also finds a lack of philosophical depth in the argument for constitutional originalism. Originalists suggest that returning the judiciary and American government to the principles in the Constitution is a matter of following the original intent of the Constitution’s framers. Returning to the original meaning of the Constitution is not as simple as professing belief in eighteenth-century principles. The framers’ constitution was the product of organic historical development. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention and the state ratifying conventions were liberally educated men who, on the whole, embraced a classical and Judeo-Christian view of human nature and politics that has faded from the American mind and imagination. To restore American constitutionalism, it is necessary to recover the spirit that gave the Constitution life centuries ago. The work of restoration is largely a cultural problem. Families, schools, universities, and the media have to understand and embrace the moral realism that made the Constitution possible. How likely is it that, in an age of idealism and scientific naturalism, a sufficient number of Americans will attune their imagination, political thinking, and character to a worldview that is widely maligned in most American cultural institutions? The culture itself must be changed before political reforms can have their intended effect.
Conservatives have also tended to approach economics in an abstract way, what Ryn calls Jacobin capitalism. In his view, free markets do not in themselves ensure prudent or virtuous behavior. Markets exist in a culture that can lead to a variety of consequences. Capitalism is not a singular phenomenon. It has different meanings and manifests differently depending on cultural, historical, and ideological circumstances. Like democracy, capitalism may or may not be consistent with the highest aspirations of human life. In short, the notion that there is a uniform capitalism that has the same effects in every set of circumstances is a fiction. Yet, ahistorical capitalism has become part of a universal ideology for many conservatives. Capitalism can be destructive to traditions and the established ways of life that conservatives aim to preserve. Economic innovation that replaces family farms and businesses with giant, impersonal corporations that destroy economic diversity and local communities can hardly be considered conservative. To be sure, capitalism can be constructive to community and human thriving. Ryn points to Wilhelm Röpke as an example of an economic thinker who understands capitalism not as an ideological abstraction but as an evolving economic system with a broad range of potential outcomes. It requires the support of cultural institutions that make economic exchange and production humane.
The great danger for America is the influence of a pseudo-religion that obscures the reality of what makes sound political order possible. Ryn uses Jacobinism as a general term to describe the tendency to idealize and universalize politics. Romantic sentiment has changed the way Americans think about and imagine democracy and politics. What has especially been lost is the connection between virtue and the ends of politics. The good that can be done in politics is dependent on individuals who have constitutional personalities. They thrive in a constitutional system of checks and balances because they are sober about human nature and politics and are willing to check their misguided passions and interests. They understand that politics is the art of the possible and that the wisdom of experience, and philosophical reason, not abstract ideologically-derived ideas, are what direct statesmen to a politics of prudence.
The Failure of American Conservatism and the Road Not Taken is a candid assessment of how conservatives have missed opportunities to preserve American and Western civilization. Ryn does not deny that intellectual conservatism made valuable contributions. The focus of the book is on its failures and missed opportunities. He aims to philosophically enrich conservatism, not to fuse factions of conservatism for short-term political gain. Ryn argues that American conservatism failed because it was philosophically disoriented by a misguided pragmatism; it misunderstood the historical and cultural circumstances in which it attempted to restore limited government, promote free economic markets, and promote a strong national defense. To avoid repeating the same mistakes in the future, American conservatives need to focus more attention on deepening their philosophical understanding of politics and rejecting superficial intellectual conservatism as well as political ideology. Moving toward this objective requires reorienting the conservative mind and imagination to foster a deep attachment to ethical realism. The shortcut, reductionistic ideological beliefs of the past must be discarded, not the least of which are American exceptionalism and ahistorical thinking generally. The Failure of American Conservatism and the Road Not Taken is a meaningful start in the direction of reorienting a movement that has lost its way in the throes of election politics. Reconstituting the American order will take generations and require conservatives to enter the cultural trenches, the academy, the arts, churches, entertainment, and most of all, philosophy. Imbued by a deep philosophy of moral realism, conservatives will be in a better place to oppose and explode the radical, liberal illusions that have eroded American and Western civilization. Conservative public policy is more likely to succeed if it is imbued with philosophical realism.
Michael Federici is professor of political science at Middle Tennessee State University and the author or editor of several books, including The Political Philosophy of Alexander Hamilton.
[1] Ryn has contributed to the understanding of politics and the needs of the ethical life. See his Democracy and the Ethical Life: A Philosophy of Politics and Community, 2d expanded ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1990).
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